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Abstract
We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge
are privately informed about merger-specific eﬃciencies. This enables the
firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing
their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information im-
proves upon the quality of the authority’s decision, the influence activities
may be detrimental to welfare if information processing/gathering is ex-
cessively costly. Whether this is the case depends on the merger control
institution and, in particular, whether it involves an eﬃciency defense.
We derive the optimal institution and provide conditions under which an
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“[A] policy of approving anticompetitive mergers for eﬃciency reasons is likely
to promote a dissipation of resources into rent seeking.” Franklin M. Fisher
(1987, p. 39)
1 Introduction
The appropriate regulation of mergers is an important policy issue in the U.S.
as well as in Europe, and the question whether eﬃciency gains (either proven or
only claimed) should constitute a reason not to challenge an otherwise anticom-
petitive merger is much debated.1 Williamson (1968) was the first to stress that
the decision whether to permit a merger potentially involves a welfare tradeoﬀ:
whereas permitting the merger is likely to increase the merged unit’s market
power, as doing this reduces the number of rivals competing in the market, it
may also allow the newly created firm to realize eﬃciency gains. One strand
of the theoretical literature on mergers has investigated this tradeoﬀ in various
oligopoly models; see, for example, Williamson (1968), Deneckere and Davidson
(1985), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), and Spector (2003).
While these contributions can inform an antitrust authority’s decision whether
to permit a proposed merger and, for example, provide reasons to be very skep-
tical, they do not explain why an antitrust authority as a matter of principle
should rule out the possibility that an anticompetitive merger may be permitted
for eﬃciency reasons: rules and guidelines that do exactly this (like the previous
ones used in the U.S. and the E.U.) cannot be justified by the literature cited
above. However, one conceivable benefit with making an irreversible commit-
ment not to permit mergers for eﬃciency reasons is that this may discourage
rent seeking or other forms of influence activities. This point has indeed often
been made in the literature; see, for example, the above quotation by Fisher.2
1Currently, the American policy allows for an explicit eﬃciency defense. Until fairly re-
cently, however, the U.S. policy, as expressed by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, placed much less weight on
the eﬃciency criterion; for a discussion and evaluation of these changes of the Guidelines, in
particular with respect to the treatment of eﬃciencies, see for example Farrell and Shapiro
(2001) and several of the contributions in the Spring 1999 issue of the George Mason Law
Review. The European Commission has also just recently made a move toward taking possible
eﬃciencies into account when assessing proposed mergers; for discussions, see Röller, Stennek,
and Verboven (2001), Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn (2001), and European Commission (2001).
One reason why the European Commission decided to make this move was that the increased
frequency of cross-border mergers raised the question whether American and European rules
should be harmonized.
2The argument can be found also in Neven et al. (1993, p. 213, footnote 41) and in Röller
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Yet it is not clear whether all kinds of influence activities should count as a so-
cial cost of allowing for an eﬃciency defense. For if the activities take the form
of outright monetary bribes, then they merely represent a transfer of wealth
between diﬀerent economic agents. Similarly, one often-mentioned reason why
allowing for an eﬃciency defense may make the merger control procedure easier
to influence is that the merging firms (hereafter called the insiders) typically
have superior access to information about any eﬃciencies;3 hence, by strategi-
cally transmitting such information to the antitrust authority, the insiders may
be able to achieve a favorable decision. The welfare eﬀects of such influence
activities could be either positive or negative, depending on whether the cost
of gathering, processing, and transmitting the information is oﬀset by its social
benefits.4 ,5
Thus, in order to better understand under what circumstances influence ac-
tivities may serve as a reason not to allow for an eﬃciency defense, it is important
to model the reason why they may be influential and then, in an equilibrium
analysis, investigate the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent merger control institutions,
with and without an eﬃciency defense. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no attempt in the literature to do this. The present paper tries to fill this gap.
Although the model we develop is relatively simple, it captures three important
et al. (2001, p. 117-118).
3The Horizontal Merger Guidelines (U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Federal Trade
Commission, 1997, Section 4) state explicitly that “[...] much of the information relating
to eﬃciencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms.” Yao and Dahdouh (1993)
discuss the problem of informational asymmetries in merger control at length and argue that
asymmetries in the access to information are particularly important for eﬃciencies.
4An early paper that explicitly interprets rent-seeking expenditures as costs of information
gathering is Tullock (1975). Later work that has provided informational foundations to the
rent-seeking theory, by showing that there may be overinvestment in information acqusition
from a social welfare point of view, includes Shavell (1994) and Lagerlöf (1997). More generally,
lobbying as a form of strategic information transmission has been modeled in, for example,
Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (2001).
5Recently, the consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003) conducted a survey that
estimates the costs to business of multi-jurisdictional merger reviews. It shows that, in cases
that led to an in-depth review, an acquiring company’s external costs (e.g., hiring consultants)
amounted to on average 5.4 million euros, and the average internal costs (use of own personnel),
measured in person weeks, were 120. For some companies in the sample the numbers are much
higher: the corresponding averages for the top quartile are 15 million euros and 389 person
weeks (or around 8 person years). There are also quite large diﬀerences across jurisdictions,
with filings in the U.S. leading to significantly higher costs than filings in the E.U.
Even though the survey suﬀers from a low response rate (14 percent), which might have led
to a selection bias, we take these numbers as an indication that costs of merger enquiries can
be quite substantial. We also want to emphasize, however, that some of our arguments do
not rely on merger reviews being excessively costly. In our model, an eﬃciency defense can
be suboptimal with a large margin and at the same time induce very low costs. When this
happens, the reason why an eﬃciency defense is bad is that it makes it too diﬃcult, also from
society’s point of view, for the firms to merge (see the example in the end of Section 4).
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aspects of a merger control procedure: Williamson’s tradeoﬀ between increased
market power and possible eﬃciency gains, the insiders’ having superior access
to information about any eﬃciencies, and these firms’ vested interest in having
the merger permitted.
In particular, we model the merger control procedure as an interaction be-
tween two economic agents: the insiders (acting as one unit) and society. The
eﬃciency gains due to the merger may be “low” or “high.” Whereas the in-
siders want to merge regardless of the size of the eﬃciencies, society wants the
merger to take place only if they are high. Initially, the insiders know only
whether the eﬃciencies are high or low. This information, however, is soft (i.e.,
non-verifiable), which means that in order to be able to credibly transmit it to
society, the insiders must first invest resources in evidence production. If they
do this and if they are successful, they find hard (i.e., verifiable) information
about the size of the eﬃciency gains, which they (if this is in their interest) can
disclose to society.6 The role of society is to choose a merger control institution,
by which we mean a rule whether to permit the proposed merger conditional on
whether the insiders have submitted a report and whether this report showed
that the eﬃciencies are high or low. We assume that society commits to such
a rule at an ex ante stage. A merger control institution that “allows for an
eﬃciency defense” is understood as a rule where the fact that the insiders have
provided hard information about the size of the eﬃciencies (instead of not hav-
ing done this) aﬀects the probability that the merger is permitted.
In an equilibrium of this model, the insiders will never invest in evidence pro-
duction when having soft information that the eﬃciencies are low. When they
have soft information that the eﬃciencies are high, whether and to what extent
they invest depend on what institution society has chosen. An institution that
does not allow for an eﬃciency defense will not induce any evidence production
at all. Two examples of such institutions that are important in our analysis are
what we call the laissez-faire regime (LF) and the strict regime (SR): under LF,
a merger is always permitted while under SR it never is.7 By committing to an
6Hence, we assume that the insiders incur costs because they must process their information
(i.e., transform it from soft to hard) before being able to communicate it. We would get almost
the same results if we instead assumed that the insiders’ costs concerned the acquisition
of information; see our discussion in the concluding section. One may argue about which
assumption is the most plausible; perhaps it is something in between those two polar cases.
7The important feature of these institutions is that the decision whether to permit the
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institution that to some extent indeed allows for an eﬃciency defense, society
can induce a positive amount of evidence production. One such institution is
the one where a merger is not permitted if society receives a report saying that
the eﬃciencies are low or if it does not receive any report at all, and the merger
is permitted with a probability γ if society receives a report saying that the
eﬃciencies are high. Here, the larger is γ the more the insiders will invest. In
the extreme, when the probability γ equals unity, we obtain the hard evidence
regime (HE): a merger is permitted if and only if society receives a report saying
that the eﬃciencies are high.
Hence, in our model, a possible cost of allowing for an eﬃciency defense
is that this encourages the insiders to spend resources in order to influence
the decision whether to allow the merger. The resource costs enter the social
welfare function and may thus, in principle, be wasted. On the other hand, the
information that the insiders report might be useful for society, in which case
there also are benefits with an eﬃciency defense. Society thus faces a tradeoﬀ. It
turns out that even though society has an opportunity to fine tune the insiders’
incentives for evidence production by choosing an institution that gives rise to
a positive amount of evidence production but still less than under HE, this is
never optimal. That is, the institution that maximizes expected social welfare
is either SR, LF, or HE. One reason for this result is that society can choose
the insiders’ amount of evidence production only indirectly, through its choice
of the merger control institution. Thus, society’s ability to choose investment
incentives is limited by the insiders’ optimal response. In addition, institutions
whose outcomes diﬀer from the outcomes of SR, LF, and HE require society
to commit to an ex post merger decision that uses the available information
suboptimally.
Finding the socially optimal institution thus amounts to comparing LF, SR,
and HE, of which only HE involves an eﬃciency defense. We show that, de-
pending on the parameters of our model, any one of these three institutions
can be optimal. By inspecting the conditions needed for a particular institution
to be the best one, we arrive at some non-trivial and sometimes rather subtle
merger is not made contingent on the insiders’ reports about eﬃciencies. The decision could,
however, very well be contingent on other circumstances, as long as these are publicly known.
See our discussion in Section 5.
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conclusions about the desirability of an eﬃciency defense and the optimal de-
sign of a merger control procedure. First, as the arguments above suggest, an
eﬃciency defense is indeed sometimes desirable. When this is the case, however,
the merger should be allowed if and only if high-eﬃciency evidence is provided.
Second, an eﬃciency defense is more likely to be optimal (from a total surplus
point of view) when “high” eﬃciencies are so high that they would give rise
to a lower market price. This is because then the insiders’ incentives to invest
are such that society should encourage evidence production as much as it can.
Third, there is an important asymmetry between situations with a low respec-
tively high prior probability that a merger would increase total surplus: when
the prior is relatively low, the problem of the insiders’ dissembling can be dealt
with very easily and at no real cost, whereas this is not true for the case when
the prior is relatively high. As a consequence, an eﬃciency defense is more
desirable when the merger is unlikely to be welfare enhancing.
Although this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one to in-
vestigate the desirability of an eﬃciency defense using an equilibrium analysis,
there are some other papers that also study institutional design in the context
of merger control. Besanko and Spulber (1993) and Neven and Röller (2000),
for example, study the relative merits of a welfare standard and a consumer
standard. Similarly, Lewis and Poitevin (1997) investigate the desirability of
mandatory disclosure rules in regulatory proceedings. Laﬀont and Tirole (1993,
ch. 15) develop a model of regulatory capture and institutional design, al-
though not in the context of merger control. Our paper is also related to a
literature that models evidence production in trials or regulatory proceedings;
see, for example, Legros and Newman (1999) and Sanchirico (2001). Similarly,
information acquisition and institutional design has also been studied by, for
example, Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next, in Section 2,
we present the model. In Section 3 we begin the analysis and show that the
optimal merger control institution is either LF, SR, or HE. Then, in Section 4,
we compare these three institutions and find the optimal one. In Section 5 we
discuss the implications of our results for antitrust policy. In particular we sketch
8Other related papers include Corchón and Faulí-Oller (2003), Daughety and Reinganum
(2000), Froeb and Kobayashi (2001), and Shin (1998).
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a three-step merger control procedure that takes the influence activities into
consideration. Section 6 concludes by briefly discussing some possible extensions
and variations of our model. An Appendix contains mathematical derivations
relating to one of these extensions.
2 A Model of Merger Control and Influence Ac-
tivities
Consider the following simple model of a merger control process. There are two
economic agents: on the one hand society and on the other two firms that have
proposed to merge (acting as one unit). The two firms, which are hereafter
called the insiders, should be thought of as producing and selling a good on
an oligopolistic market, although the market interaction will not be explicitly
modeled here. The other firms in that market (the outsiders), as well as the
consumers, are passive in that they do not attempt to influence the merger
control process.9
The eﬃciency of the new firm that is created if the merger takes place, de-
noted e, is either “low” (e = eL) or “high” (e = eH). Initially, e is private
information to the insiders: society places the prior probability p on the event
that the post-merger eﬃciency is high, where p ∈ (0, 1). Although the insid-
ers know the true post-merger eﬃciency from the outset, the information they
have is assumed to be soft (i.e., non-verifiable). This means that, given the
preferences that we will specify shortly, the insiders will not be able to credi-
bly transmit their information to society–for that they will first have to invest
resources in evidence production (more on this later).
We assume that regardless of whether the post-merger eﬃciency is low or
high, it is profitable for the insiders to merge; that is,
πH > πL > πN , (1)
where πH (respectively, πL) is the insiders’ profit if the merger is permitted and
the post-merger eﬃciency turns out to be high (respectively, low), and πN is
the insiders’ (joint) profit if the merger is blocked. Moreover, permitting the
9 In the concluding section we briefly discuss how our analysis would be aﬀected if the
outsiders or a consumer group were also taking part in the influence activities.
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merger increases social welfare if and only if the post-merger eﬃciency turns
out to be high; that is,
WH > WN > WL, (2)
where WH (respectively, WL) is the unweighted sum of consumer surplus and
industry profits if the merger is permitted and the post-merger eﬃciency turns
out to be high (respectively, low), and WN is the unweighted sum of consumer
surplus and industry profits if the merger is blocked.
Let us for notational ease write ∆πi ≡ πi−πN and ∆Wi ≡Wi−WN (for i =
L,H). In terms of this notation, (1) and (2) amount to saying that ∆πH , ∆πL,
and ∆WH are all positive, whereas ∆WL is negative. Borrowing terminology
from Farrell and Shapiro (1990), we will refer to the case where ∆WH < ∆πH
as a situation with negative externalities, and the case where ∆WH > ∆πH
as a situation with positive externalities. All our analysis will cover both these
cases. The distinction between positive and negative externalities will be helpful
in understanding the results to be derived.
Although our proofs do not rely on it, we use the following assumption to
interpret our results:
∆WH > ∆πH ⇔ ∆CSH > 0,
where ∆CSH is the gain in consumer surplus if the merger is permitted instead
of blocked, given that the post-merger eﬃciency is high. That is, the assumption
states that if there are positive externalities, then also the consumers (not only
society at large) gain from a high-eﬃciency merger. Notice that as long as
consumer surplus is aﬀected by the merger only through its eﬀect on market
price and as long as consumer surplus is decreasing in market price, a statement
that ∆CSH is positive is tantamount to saying that “high” eﬃciencies are so
high that they induce a lower post-merger than pre-merger market price.
//FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE//
Figure 1 shows how, for diﬀerent values of the eﬃciency parameter e, the
gains and losses that accrue to the various parties if a merger takes place typ-
ically relate to each other.10 The figure is derived from a homogenous-good
10Figure 1 is inspired by a similar figure in Neven and Röller (2000).
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Cournot model with at least three symmetric firms prior to the merger, where
demand and cost functions are linear, and where the eﬃciency parameter e is
subtracted from the marginal cost of the insiders. Although this is only a very
simple example, we expect the qualitative features of the figure to hold true for
a much larger family of oligopoly models.11 From the figure we see that the
insiders would themselves lose by merging if e did not exceed a threshold e◦.
Moreover, for the eﬀect on welfare to be positive, e must exceed a threshold
e0 , where e0 > e◦. Thus, in terms of these threshold values of e, (1) and (2)
amount to assuming that eL ∈
³
e◦, e0
´
and eH > e
0
. We also see from the figure
that the outsiders’ gain in profits and the gain in consumer surplus always have
opposite signs, and these signs change at a threshold e00 , where e00 > e0 ; this is
the level of e above which market price becomes lower thanks to the merger. At
the same threshold level of e, society’s gain from having the merger starts to
exceed the insiders’ gain. Thus, there are negative externalities if eH ∈
³
e0 , e00
´
,
whereas there are positive externalities if eH > e
00
.
The timing of events is as follows. (i) Society commits to a merger control
institution, z = (zL, zH , zN ) ∈ [0, 1]3. We will shortly explain exactly what it
means to choose a particular z. (ii) The insiders observe z and then “invest
in evidence production;” that is, conditional on knowing that the true state
is i ∈ {L,H}, they choose a probability τ i ∈ [0, 1], thereby incurring a cost
C (τ i). By picking a particular τ i, the insiders will with that probability find
hard (i.e., verifiable) information that the post-merger eﬃciency is ei; with the
complementary probability, 1−τ i, the insiders do not find any hard information.
(iii) If having found hard information, the insiders choose whether to “submit a
report,” that is, whether to disclose this information to society. If they do this,
also society learns the true state (since the information is verifiable). (iv) Society
decides whether to permit or block the merger, following the previously chosen
rule z = (zL, zH , zN ). The component zL (respectively, zH) of this vector is a
probability with which society permits the merger if the insiders have submitted
a report saying that the post-merger eﬃciency is low (respectively, high), and
11For example, we have verified that all the qualitative features of Figure 1 can be derived
also from a diﬀerentiated-goods Bertrand model with three symmetric firms prior to the
merger, linear demand and cost functions, and the eﬃciency parameter e being subtracted
from the marginal cost of the insiders. The only thing that changes in such a setting is that
the insiders gain from the merger even if e = 0 (which is a well-known result).
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zN is a probability with which society permits the merger if the insiders have
not submitted a report.
Hence, stage (iv) is simply an implementation of the rule that society has
committed to at stage (i).12 Notice that the set of instruments that society has
access to when it chooses an institution does not include monetary transfers
between society and the insiders.13 Otherwise, however, society has a great
deal of freedom in its choice of an institution. For at the stage where society
implements the rule z it will either know the true state (L or H) or it will
not have received a report (N), and we assume that society can commit to any
probability of allowing the merger conditional on any one of these three events.
In terms of these merger control institutions, what does it mean to say that
society “allows for an eﬃciency defense”? We interpret this as a situation where
a report submitted by the insiders aﬀects the probability with which the merger
is permitted. That is, we say that society allows for an eﬃciency defense if
either zL 6= zN or zH 6= zN . Within the set of merger control institutions
that society can choose among there are three ones that will be of particular
interest to us. The first is the institution where a merger is always permitted,
z = (1, 1, 1); we call this the laissez-faire regime (LF). The second one is the
institution where a merger is never permitted, z = (0, 0, 0), which we call the
strict regime (SR). The third institution of special interest is the one where a
merger is permitted if and only if society receives a report from the insiders
showing that the post-merger eﬃciency will be high, z = (0, 1, 0); we dub this
the hard evidence regime (HE). Clearly, neither LF nor SR involves an eﬃciency
defense, whereas HE does.
As for the cost function for evidence production, C, we assume that this is
twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, and convex (C0 > 0, C 00 > 0), with
12There may of course be a credibility problem associated with choosing some particular z,
perhaps especially for “mixed” z’s. One way to implement the desired z-institution in practice
may be to delegate the job to an antitrust oﬃcial who has the right private preferences; cf. the
literature on strategic delegation (to an independent central banker, for example). A mixed
z-institution could also correspond to a set of guidelines that to some extent are open to
interpretation and which therefore make it diﬃcult to predict perfectly the decision whether
to challenge the merger. Yet another reason that we are not too worried about the credibility
problem is that, as we will see later, it will never be optimal for society to choose the mixed
z’s anyway.
13We find this assumption reasonable in the context of merger control. For a paper that does
allow for such transfers and which models the merger control procedure as an implementation
problem, see Corchón and Faulí-Oller (2003).
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C (0) = 0, C 0 (0) = 0, and C0 (1) > ∆πH . Also, the cost elasticity is weakly
increasing: η0 (τ i) ≥ 0 for all τ i ∈ [0, 1], where η (τ i) ≡ C
0
(τ i) τ i/C (τ i).14
The cost of evidence production incurred by the insiders enters with full
weight in society’s payoﬀ. Hence, given an outcome j (for j = L,H,N) of the
merger control procedure and given that the insiders have soft information that
e = ei (for i = L,H), the insiders’ payoﬀ is πj − C (τ i) and society’s payoﬀ is
Wj−C (τ i). We also assume that the insiders as well as society are risk neutral
and thus maximize their expected payoﬀs given the information they have access
to at the time of their decisions. Society’s expected payoﬀ (“expected welfare”)
is also the welfare standard that we employ for our normative theory.15
3 Influence Activities and Institutional Choice
We will solve the model using backward induction. Since the last stage is just
a mechanical implementation of the rule society chooses at stage (i), we are
left with three stages where actual decisions are made: the choice-of-institution
stage (i), the evidence-production stage (ii), and the reporting stage (iii).
Recall that the insiders want the merger to be permitted regardless of whether
the post-merger eﬃciency is low or high. Hence, at stage (iii), given that they
have found hard information that e = ei, the insiders will submit a report for
sure if zi > zN ; if zi = zN they are indiﬀerent between submitting and not sub-
mitting; and if zi < zN they will not submit. Similarly, at stage (ii), given that
they have soft information that e = ei, the insiders will invest in evidence pro-
duction (i.e., choose a τ i > 0) if and only if zi > zN . Clearly, however, society
will never choose zL > zN . For if society knows that the post-merger eﬃciency
is low, it is in its interest to block the merger. (Moreover, setting zL > zN
would encourage costly evidence production under circumstances where this is
not valuable for society.) As a result, if the institution z is optimally chosen,
the insiders will set τL = 0.
When having soft information that e = eH , the insiders face the following
14For some results in the end of the paper we will need the stronger assumption that the
cost elasticity is constant. We will make this clear when we get there.
15 In the concluding section we will discuss the implications for our results of using a con-
sumer standard instead.
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problem:
max
τH∈[0,1]
[τHzH + (1− τH) zN ]πH+[τH (1− zH) + (1− τH) (1− zN )]πN−C (τH) ,
the solution of which, τ∗H , equals zero if zH ≤ zN and is implicitly defined by
∆πH (zH − zN ) = C
0
(τ∗H) (3)
otherwise. The left-hand side of this first-order condition is the insiders’ mar-
ginal benefit from evidence production when knowing that e = eH . The first
factor of the marginal benefit, ∆πH , is the insiders’ gain in profits from having
the merger permitted instead of blocked given that e = eH . The second factor,
(zH − zN ), is the amount with which the probability of having the merger per-
mitted increases if the insiders provide hard information that the post-merger
eﬃciency is high. The magnitude of this latter factor is determined by society’s
choice of institution. In particular, (zH − zN ) will take its largest possible value
under the institution HE, since then zH = 1 and zN = 0. Hence, the insid-
ers’ incentives for evidence production when knowing that e = eH will be the
strongest possible under HE.16 Similarly, under LF and SR, the insiders will
have no incentives at all to invest in evidence production (τ∗H = 0), since then
zH = zN .
What is society’s optimal choice of institution at stage (i)? To answer this
question, let us first formulate expressions for expected welfare at stage (i) under
LF, SR, and HE, which we denote by EWLF , EWSR, and EWHE , respectively.
Since under LF and SR the insiders will not invest in evidence production, we
almost trivially have EWLF = pWH+(1− p)WL and EWSR =WN . Denoting
the insiders’ choice of τH under HE by τHEH ,17 we can write
EWHE = pτHEH WH + (1− pτHEH )WN − pC
¡
τHEH
¢
= pτHEH ∆WH +EWSR − pC
¡
τHEH
¢
. (4)
This equation highlights a basic tradeoﬀ in society’s choice of institution. By
choosing an institution that encourages evidence production, like HE, instead of
16Notice the importance of the qualifier “when knowing that e = eH .” The institution that
provides the strongest incentives for evidence production more generally is z = (1, 1, 0), since
this would make also τ∗L as large as possible. Of course, however, choosing an institution that
induces a τ∗L > 0 will, as we noted above, never be in society’s interest.
17Formally, τHEH = τ∗H |(zH ,zN )=(1,0).
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one that does not, like SR, society will sometimes be able to avoid the mistake
of blocking a welfare enhancing merger; this benefit with HE is captured by
the term pτHEH ∆WH in (4). Society also cares about the insiders’ expected
cost of evidence production, however, which is captured by the term pC
¡
τHEH
¢
.
The comparison of HE and SR thus amounts to a comparison of τHEH ∆WH and
C
¡
τHEH
¢
, where τHEH is implicitly defined by ∆πH = C
0 ¡τHEH ¢. Accordingly,
which institution society should choose will depend on, among other things, how
aligned society’s and the insiders’ interests are and on the properties of the cost
function C.
In order to solve society’s problem at stage (i) we will also need a more
general expression for expected welfare that holds for any relevant institution z.
Recall that choosing zL > zN will always be suboptimal for society. Moreover,
setting zN > zH yields the same outcome as setting zN = zH (since for any zN ≥
zH the insiders will choose τ∗H = 0 and thus not be able to report when knowing
that e = eH). Hence, without excluding any (uniquely) optimal institution we
can suppose that
zL ≤ zN ≤ zH .
Under this assumption, we can write expected welfare at stage (i) as
EW = p [τ∗HzH + (1− τ∗H) zN ]WH + (1− p)zNWL
+ {p [τ∗H (1− zH) + (1− τ∗H) (1− zN)] + (1− p) (1− zN )}WN − pC (τ∗H)
= pτ∗H (zH − zN )∆WH + (1− zN )EWSR + zNEWLF − pC (τ∗H) . (5)
Now, rewriting the first-order condition that defines τ∗H [see (3)] yields
∆πH (zH − zN ) = C
0
(τ∗H) =
η (τ∗H)
τ∗H
C (τ∗H)⇒ τ∗H (zH − zN ) =
η (τ∗H)
∆πH
C (τ∗H) .
(6)
Substituting (6) in (5) and re-arranging, one has
EW = pC (τ∗H)
∆WH
∆πH
·
η (τ∗H)−
∆πH
∆WH
¸
+ (1− zN )EWSR + zNEWLF , (7)
which implies that, for η (τ∗H) < ∆πH∆WH , society is strictly better oﬀ by choosing
either LF or SR rather than an institution that induces investment in evidence
production (τ∗H > 0). Moreover, if z is an optimal institution and if it gives rise
to η (τ∗H) = ∆πH∆WH , then either LF or SR is (also) an optimal institution.
Next, suppose η (τ∗H) > ∆πH∆WH . We then obtain the following result.
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Lemma 1. Let zL ≤ zN ≤ zH and (zH − zN ) ∈ (0, 1), and suppose that
η (τ∗H) > ∆πH∆WH . Then EW < (1− zN )EW
HE + zNEWLF .
Proof. We can write
EW = (zH − zN )
pτ∗H∆WH
η (τ∗H)
·
η (τ∗H)−
∆πH
∆WH
¸
+ (1− zN )EWSR + zNEWLF
< (1− zN )
(
pτHEH ∆WH
η
¡
τHEH
¢ ·η ¡τHEH ¢− ∆πH
∆WH
¸
+EWSR
)
+ zNEWLF
= (1− zN )
"
pτHEH ∆WH −
pτHEH ∆πH
η
¡
τHEH
¢ +EWSR#+ zNEWLF .
Here the first equality follows from (6) and (7); the inequality follows from
τ∗H < τHEH , zH ≤ 1, and η0 ≥ 0;18 and the last equality is just a re-arrangement
of terms. Making use of (4) and of (6) evaluated at τ∗H = τHEH , zN = 0, and
zH = 1, we have the inequality in the lemma. ¤
The following proposition follows immediately from Lemma 1 and the pre-
ceding analysis.19
Proposition 1. No institution yields a higher expected welfare than the best
one of SR, LF, and HE. Moreover, an institution where zL > zN is never
optimal, and an institution where (zH − zN ) ∈ (0, 1) is never optimal if
η (τ∗H) 6= ∆πH∆WH .
In other words, when society chooses an institution at stage (i), it will opti-
mally select one that either induces no evidence production at all or one where
the insiders’ incentives for evidence production when knowing that e = eH are
as strong as possible–in that sense society’s problem always has a corner solu-
tion. What is the reason for this? One economic force that works in favor of a
corner solution is that choosing a “mixed” z-institution involves throwing away
costly but socially valuable information: by selecting such an institution society
will sometimes learn that the true post-merger eﬃciency is high, but still it
does not permit the merger with probability one. The institutions SR, LF and
18Note in particular that η0 ≥ 0 implies that the expression on the first line is increasing in
τ∗H .
19Note that, even though it involves the endogenous variable τ∗H , the case we exclude from
consideration in the last statement of the proposition is indeed non-generic. This is true
because the definition of τ∗H does not contain ∆WH , which means that ∆WH appears only
on the right-hand side of η
?
τ∗H
?
= ∆πH∆WH
; hence, this equality holds for one unique value of
∆WH .
13
HE, in contrast, do not involve such waste. For under LF and SR there is no
investment at all in evidence production. And under HE there is, but then the
information is always made use of in the sense that society permits the merger
with probability one when having learned that the eﬃciencies are high.
More generally, important for the corner-solution result is the fact that so-
ciety cannot choose τL and τH directly, only indirectly through its choice of
a z-institution. This means that society’s optimal choice of an institution will
depend on the insiders’ response. As a consequence, society’s objective function
is not necessarily a quasi-concave function of the choice variables. Moreover,
even when this objective function happens to be quasi-concave, society’s limited
set of instruments will make an institution where the insiders choose an interior
τH undesirable.
4 The Optimal Merger Control Institution
It remains to answer the question how the three institutions LF, SR, and HE
perform in terms of expected welfare relative to each other. In doing this we
will impose a stronger assumption on the cost function C than before. Instead
of just assuming that the cost elasticity is everywhere weakly increasing, we will
from now on say that the cost elasticity is constant; that is, C (τ i) = kτηi for
i = L,H, where k > 0 and η > 1.20 In order to make the comparisons it will be
useful to distinguish between two parameter regimes: p < p (“Regime I”), and
p > p (“Regime II”), where p ≡ (WN −WL) / (WH −WL).21 Regime I should
thus be thought of as a situation where society is relatively skeptical about the
possibility of large eﬃciency gains, whereas in Regime II society is relatively
optimistic about this possibility.
First, it is easy to see that SR dominates LF in Regime I, and vice versa
in Regime II. Second, it turns out that SR strictly dominates HE if and only if
η < ∆πH/∆WH . To see this, simply plug zN = 0, τ∗H = τHEH , and η (τ∗H) = η
20This stronger assumption will actually only be needed for the comparison of LF and
HE. The comparison of LF and SR will of course not depend on the cost function, and our
comparison of SR and HE below easily extends to any arbitrary elasticity η (τ i). Still, to
simplify the exposition, we make the stronger assumption already from the outset of this
section.
21We will ignore the knife-edge case p = p.
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into (7), which yields
EWHE = pC
¡
τHEH
¢ ∆WH
∆πH
µ
η − ∆πH
∆WH
¶
+EWSR.
It remains to compare HE and LF. From the above expression for EWHE we
see that EWHE > EWLF is equivalent to
pC
¡
τHEH
¢ ∆WH
∆πH
µ
η − ∆πH
∆WH
¶
> EWLF −EWSR = p∆WH + (1− p)∆WL,
(8)
the right-hand side of which is negative in Regime I and positive in Regime II.
First suppose we are in Regime I. Then, if η ≥ ∆πH/∆WH , we clearly have
EWHE > EWLF . In case η < ∆πH/∆WH there exists a level of k, call it bk,
such that EWHE > EWLF if and only if k > bk. Using (8), the fact that
C
¡
τHEH
¢
= k
−1
η−1
µ
∆πH
η
¶ η
η−1
,
and carrying out some straightforward algebra, we obtain
bk ≡ µ∆πHη
¶η

p∆WH∆πH
³
η − ∆πH∆WH
´
p∆WH + (1− p)∆WL


η−1
.
Next suppose we are in Regime II. Then for η ≤ ∆πH/∆WH we always have
EWHE < EWLF . In case η > ∆πH/∆WH , we can, similarly to above, verify
that EWHE > EWLF if and only if k < bk.
Let us summarize the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Society ranks the three institutions LF, SR, and HE as follows:
• SR Â LF in Regime I, and LF Â SR in Regime II.
• HE Â SR if and only if η > ∆πH/∆WH .
• In Regime I, HE Â LF if and only if either (i) η ≥ ∆πH/∆WH or
(ii) η < ∆πH/∆WH and k > bk. In Regime II, LF Â HE if and only
if either (i) η ≤ ∆πH/∆WH or (ii) η > ∆πH/∆WH and k > bk.
By using Proposition 2 we can easily construct an overall ranking of the three
institutions. Figure 2 indicates for what parameter values we obtain particular
rankings; Panel A of the figure covers Regime I whereas Panel B covers Regime
II. Each panel depicts a diagram with k on the vertical and η on the horizontal
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axis, and in each diagram the graphs of two functions are drawn: bk defined above
and k◦ ≡ ∆πH/η. The latter function gives us a threshold of k above which
this parameter must be for the insiders’ evidence-production decision under HE
to have an interior solution (i.e., for τHEH < 1).
//FIGURE 2 (PANELS A AND B) ABOUT HERE//
Before we proceed to discuss the intuition as to why we obtain the various
rankings in diﬀerent parts of the parameter space, let us make the observa-
tion that the institution HE, which is the only one of the three institutions
that involves an eﬃciency defense, is indeed sometimes the best one. Hence,
Propositions 1 and 2 tell us that an eﬃciency defense is sometimes desirable.
When this is the case, however, the merger should be allowed if and only if
high-eﬃciency evidence is provided–in a sense, the burden of proof should be
placed fully on the insiders.22 The logic behind this conclusion is that an insti-
tution where the burden of proof is placed fully on the insiders will give them
strong incentives for evidence production [cf. (3) and the discussion following
that equation]. Moreover, encouraging evidence production will under certain
circumstances be socially desirable.
It is interesting to note that the argument that the burden of proof as to
eﬃciencies should rest on the insiders has been made before in the literature,
although the logic leading up to this conclusion has been quite diﬀerent from
the one here. For example, Fisher (1987, p. 36) writes: “The burden of proof
as to cost savings or other oﬀsetting eﬃciencies [...] should rest squarely on the
proponents of a merger, and here I would require a very high standard. Such
claims are easily made and, I think, often too easily believed.” It seems clear
that in making this statement Fisher is concerned about the truthfulness of
the insiders’ claims, and he thinks of placing the burden of proof on them as a
way of controlling this problem. A very similar point is made by Neven et al.
(1993, p. 206): “When the burden of proof is on the firm, the knowledge that
information that it conceals may count against it in the investigation provides
22We use the expression “burden of proof”with some caution: in our model, the insiders are
the only ones who have the opportunity to provide any evidence, so we cannot say anything
about whether society should require the insiders in contrast to, say, the outsiders to provide
evidence in favor of their case. The sense in which the burden of proof should be placed fully
on the insiders is that society should take a skeptical stance and make a decision in favor of
the insiders only when they have provided evidence in favor of their case.
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a powerful incentive in favour of revelation.” This argument goes back to the
so-called unraveling result in the disclosure literature, which is due to Grossman
(1981) and Milgrom (1981). The argument of the present paper is very diﬀerent
from–and should be thought of as complementary to–the unraveling result.
Indeed, updating of beliefs is not an issue here, because of our commitment as-
sumption. Our analysis instead suggests that allowing a merger if and only if the
insiders provide high-eﬃciency evidence may, besides encouraging information
revelation, also serve another important purpose, namely to provide the insiders
with strong incentives for socially valuable evidence production (or information
acquisition).23
Next, let us consider the condition HE Â SR if and only if η > ∆πH/∆WH ,
which we derived above and which plays a particularly important role in Panel
A of Figure 2. If there are positive externalities (i.e., if ∆WH > ∆πH), then this
condition says that we always have HE Â SR, since η > 1.24 This is intuitive,
because if having a high-eﬃciency merger permitted instead of blocked is worth
more to society than to the insiders then the merging firms will underinvest, so
society should encourage evidence production as much as it can. Recall from
Section 2 that having positive externalities means that a “high” post-merger
eﬃciency is so high that it would make consumer surplus increase. Hence, a
suﬃcient condition for HE to dominate SR (and, in Regime I, for HE to be
the best institution) is that, conditional on the event that the merger makes
total surplus increase, the eﬃciency gains are so large that they are passed
on to consumers in the form of a lower price. The reason why we obtain this
result is not that we are using a welfare measure that takes into account only
changes in consumer surplus–our welfare measure does indeed consider total
23Another interesting question concerns the optimal standard of proof: how convincing
should one should require a given piece of evidence to be and what should be the minimal
level of eﬃciency that must be proven? In our model we have abstracted from these questions
since, by assumption, a piece of information either reveals the true state perfectly or not at all
and our state space is binary. In a richer model, in which one or both of those assumptions were
relaxed, we would be able to derive the optimal standard of proof. If we did that, however,
we would not generally expect the highest possible standard to be optimal. For requiring a
very high standard of proof would not necessarily create the strongest possible incentives for
evidence production. To see this, imagine an example were there are more than two states
and where the insiders can get their case through only by finding evidence in favor of the very
highest state. This might be so diﬃcult and costly to do that investing in evidence production
would not be as worthwhile as under a less stringent standard-of-proof requirement.
24Notice that both Panel A and B are drawn for the case where there are negative exter-
nalities.
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surplus.25 Rather, the reason is that when “high” eﬃciencies are so high that
they induce a lower post-merger price, then the relationship between society’s
and the insiders’ interests is such that an eﬃciency defense will never give rise
to overinvestment in evidence production and, hence, investment in evidence
production should be fully encouraged.
If there are negative externalities, then HE will dominate SR only if the
cost elasticity is large enough. Why does the cost elasticity play such an im-
portant role here? One–perhaps rather mechanical–way of seeing this is by
noticing that for large elasticities the cost C (τH) is low relative to the amount
of information that one gets for these expenditures, τH ,26 which clearly makes
HE more attractive. Another way of understanding the role of the cost elastic-
ity, which is more in terms of economics, is to make the following observation:
in equilibrium, the cost elasticity equals the insiders’ “surplus from evidence
production”; that is, if we let B
¡
τHEH
¢
denote the insiders’ gross benefit from
having HE instead of SR conditional on knowing that e = eH ,27 then we can
write28
η =
B
¡
τHEH
¢
C
¡
τHEH
¢ . (9)
Hence, the larger is η, the more do the insiders’ benefits of having HE rather
than SR exceed their costs. As a result, for large enough η’s, HE will be socially
desirable also when there are negative externalities.
Now let us move our attention from Panel A to Panel B. Here, for HE to
be the best institution, it does not suﬃce that η > ∆πH/∆WH . As the figure
indicates, the requirement on η is stronger than that. Moreover, the other
parameter in the cost function, k, must not be too large. Apparently, there is an
asymmetry between a situation where society is skeptical about the possibility
of large eﬃciency gains (Regime I) and one where it is more optimistic (Regime
II): in the latter case HE (and, hence, an eﬃciency defense) is less likely to be
25Compare the following statement by Fisher (1987, p. 38), who clearly has a consumer
standard in mind: “...I would hesitate to use such eﬃciencies as an excuse for permitting a
merger if those eﬃciencies are unlikely to be passed on to consumers.”
26This is a property of the cost function C (τH) = kτηH . To see this, the reader may find
it helpful to sketch the graph of C (τH) as a function of τH for diﬀerent η’s. For η’s close
to unity the graph is almost linear whereas for larger η’s it is more curved, which makes it
possible to have relatively large τH ’s and at the same time low levels of C (τH).
27Formally, B
?
τHEH
?
≡ E
?
πHE | e = eH
?
−EπSR =
?
τHEH ∆πH + πN
?
−πN = τHEH ∆πH .
28To see this, note that, by definition, η = τHC
0
(τH) /C (τH). Moreover, from the first-
order condition that defines τHEH , we have τHEH C
0 ?τHEH
?
= B
?
τHEH
?
.
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optimal. The basic reason for this asymmetry is that the insiders have a vested
interest in having the merger permitted, regardless of whether the eﬃciency
gains are small or large. Moreover, in Regime I this vested interest will be
easier to deal with for society than in Regime II. For, in Regime I, if not having
received a report it will be optimal for society to block the merger, whereas in
Regime II it may in that case be optimal to permit the merger. This means
that in Regime I society will need to know about a high state, something it
can obtain information about with a relatively large likelihood by choosing the
institution HE. In Regime II, however, society would like to know about a low
state, which they never will get information about from the insiders.
The asymmetry between Regime I and II is neatly illustrated by considering
the limits p→ 0 and p→ 1. In the former case we still have the condition that
HE is best if and only if η > ∆πH∆WH , since that condition is independent of p. In
the latter case, however, LF is always the best institution.
Proposition 3 sums up the results.
Proposition 3. The institution that maximizes expected welfare is:
• In Regime I: SR if η < ∆πH∆WH and HE if η > ∆πH∆WH .
• In Regime II: LF if η < ∆πH∆WH , or η > ∆πH∆WH and k > bk; and HE if
η > ∆πH∆WH and k < bk.
The bottom line message of Proposition 3 and the preceding analysis can be
stated as follows. By allowing for an eﬃciency defense society also encourages
costly evidence production (or information acquisition). Doing this may be
good or bad, depending on (i) how society’s and the insiders’ interests relate
to each other, (ii) how optimistic or pessimistic society is about the likelihood
that the merger will increase total surplus, and (iii) the technology for evidence
production (in particular the cost elasticity). An eﬃciency defense will indeed
be optimal under some circumstances–but, when this is the case, the merger
should be allowed if and only if the insiders provide evidence of high eﬃciencies.
Moreover, an eﬃciency defense is more likely to be optimal (from a total surplus
point of view) when “high” eﬃciencies are so high that they would give rise to
a lower market price. This is because then the insiders’ incentives to invest
are such that society should encourage evidence production as much as it can.
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Finally, there is an important asymmetry between a situation where society is
pessimistic and where it is optimistic about the possibility that total surplus will
increase due to the merger: an eﬃciency defense is more likely to be harmful in
the latter case.
We have seen that an eﬃciency defense can be undesirable because it leads
to excessively high spending on evidence production. As the following example
shows, it can also be undesirable (relative to LF) if a high (marginal) cost
of evidence production deters the production of evidence, which then leads to
the blocking of mergers that society would want allowed. When this happens,
an eﬃciency defense is undesirable even though the observed costs of evidence
production are negligible.
Example. Suppose ∆WH = ∆πH = 200 (which means that there
are “no externalities”) and ∆WL = −100. Moreover, let p = 1/2,
which means that we are in Regime II (i.e., LF Â SR). Further
assume that the cost function is quadratic: η = 2. We then have
that bk = k◦ = 100, so the assumption that we have an interior
solution to the evidence production decision (k > k◦) amounts to
k > 100. In terms of Panel B of Figure 2, we are now somewhere
along the vertical line that crosses the intersection of the graphs ofbk and k◦, but above this intersection. As the figure tells us, in this
part of the parameter space LF Â HE Â SR; that is, here one should
not allow for an eﬃciency defense but instead allow all mergers.
The investment costs in this example are C
¡
τHEH
¢
= 10, 000/k, an
expression that is decreasing in k; the reason is that, even though k
enters directly in the cost function with a positive sign, the endoge-
nously chosen τHEH is decreasing in k, and this latter eﬀect domi-
nates the first.29 Hence, for a fixed ∆WH , we can make C
¡
τHEH
¢
very small by increasing k. Yet, LF Â HE (indeed, the diﬀerence
EWLF −EWHE is increasing in k).
While the argument that an eﬃciency defense can be undesirable due to
29Since C
?
τHEH
?
= k
−1
η−1
?
∆πH
η
? η
η−1 , the endogenously chosen costs of evidence produc-
tion are always decreasing in k and hence this fact does not depend on the chosen numerical
example.
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excessively high costs of evidence production is incomplete, it is not incorrect in
general. One can construct a similar example for the case in which SR Â LF (so
that Panel A of Figure 2 is relevant). Here the excessive-cost intuition as to why
an eﬃciency defense may be bad is indeed correct; the easiest way to see this is
from (4) and the discussion following that equation. In particular, in Regime I
both the (expected) investment costs and the benefit with having an eﬃciency
defense are decreasing in k. Hence, also for a very low level of merger review
expenditures, the expenditures may not be worthwhile for society. In contrast
to Regime II, however, when in this case an eﬃciency defense is suboptimal and
induces very low costs, it is suboptimal only with a small margin.
5 Implications for Antitrust Policy
Our results are, of course, derived from a stylized model, and by studying our
particular set-up we have abstracted from many economic phenomena that are
important for the choice of a merger control institution but which are not cap-
tured here. Still, keeping these limitations in mind, it is useful to spell out
what our results imply for antitrust policy and the design of merger control
institutions.
Let us first be more specific about how we interpret the institutions LF and
SR of our model. We think of these as representing situations where society
(or an antitrust authority) has made a commitment not to take eﬃciency con-
siderations into account when deciding whether to permit the merger. Still,
these institutions are fully consistent with a merger control procedure in which
this decision is contingent on other circumstances, as long as information about
these is publicly available. Thus, what we believe is special with eﬃciency gains
is that this is something that the insiders are likely to have (or be able to obtain)
private information about.
Another important question is how one should understand the insiders’ “in-
fluence activities.” One interpretation, which is the one we emphasize here, is
that this term refers to the insiders’ communication with an antitrust authority
in a formal regulatory hearing. Another and broader interpretation would be
that the influence activities also take place in informal (and perhaps secret)
interactions between the insiders and oﬃcials from the antitrust authority. As
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long as we are willing to make the former interpretation, it seems reasonable
that the decision whether to allow for an eﬃciency defense does not have to be
made once and for all, but could be made contingent on information about a
particular merger case. If so, then we can make use of the results and insights
from the previous section in order to design a merger control procedure that
allows for an eﬃciency defense only when the circumstances are right.
Below we sketch such a procedure. This involves three steps,30 and it is
constructed by means of simply inspecting Panel A and B of Figure 2: first it is
determined which panel is the relevant; then it is decided where in a particular
panel we are likely to be. As one moves from Step 1 to Step 2 and from Step 2 to
Step 3 in the procedure, gradually more information about various parameters is
required; for example, when a decision about the merger can be reached already
after Step 1 or 2, one does not need access to any information about the evidence
production technology. Hence, even though the nature of the tradeoﬀ that we
study in this paper is such that the technology for evidence production is bound
to matter in at least some situations, the procedure illustrates how the insights
from the model can guide an antitrust authority also when such information
is unavaliable. Our procedure presupposes that the region in Panel B where
HE is optimal is irrelevant in practice. This is always true if society, whenever
it is “optimistic” about having high eﬃciency gains, is suﬃciently optimistic
(i.e., that p is large enough). If one believes that the HE-region of Panel B is
sometimes relevant, then the procedure below will be a bit more complex.
Step 1. An antitrust authority that is faced with a proposed merger asks
itself the following. Given the information that we have access to at this stage
of the procedure (i.e., prior to any reports from the insiders about the size of the
eﬃciencies), do we think that total surplus (not including any costs of evidence
production) will rise thanks to the merger? If the answer to this question is
yes, then the antitrust authority simply permits the merger. If the answer is
no, then the antitrust authority proceeds to Step 2.
Step 2. The antitrust authority asks itself the following. Suppose, hypothet-
ically, that we knew that the total surplus gains due to the merger (not including
30The steps should be thought of as “steps of reasoning.” There is thus no need to let (a
significant amount of) time elapse between one step and the following.
22
any costs of evidence production) indeed would be positive. Then, conditional
on that information, do we think the eﬃciencies are so high that they would be
passed on to consumers (i.e., induce a lower post-merger price)? If the answer
to this question is yes, then the antitrust authority asks the insiders to provide
it with evidence about the size of the eﬃciencies. In case the insiders do come
up with convincing evidence that the eﬃciencies are large enough to raise total
surplus (not including any costs of evidence production), then the antitrust au-
thority permits the merger; otherwise it does not. If the answer to the question
is no, then the antitrust authority proceeds to Step 3.
Step 3. The antitrust authority asks itself the following. Suppose, hypo-
thetically, that we knew that the total surplus gains due to the merger (not
including any costs of evidence production) indeed would be positive. Then,
conditional on that information, do we think that the insiders’ technology for
evidence production (or information gathering) is such that the cost elasticity
is large relative to the rise in market price due to the merger? If the answer
to this question is yes, then the antitrust authority asks the insiders to provide
it with evidence about the size of the eﬃciencies. In case the insiders do come
up with convincing evidence that the eﬃciencies are high enough to raise total
surplus (not including any costs of evidence production), the antitrust authority
permits the merger; otherwise it does not. If the answer to the question is no,
then the antitrust authority blocks the merger without asking for evidence.
A couple of remarks about this three-step procedure are in order. First,
even though it may look as if the procedure does not consider other important
criteria than the possible existence of eﬃciency gains, these are indeed captured
by Step 1. For when the antitrust authority makes an assessment of the like-
lihood that total surplus will increase thanks to the merger, it eﬀectively also
appraises, for example, the merger’s impact on the degree of concentration in
the relevant market. Second, if the antitrust authority has to proceed to Step
3, then information about the cost elasticity will be needed. The magnitude of
this elasticity may of course be hard to observe in reality. Still, as our procedure
indicates, in several cases it will be possible to tell whether or not an eﬃciency
defense is desirable without knowing the elasticity. Inevitably, though, some-
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times knowledge about the cost elasticity will be needed. Hopefully, in those
cases the interpretation of the elasticity as the “surplus from evidence produc-
tion,” which we provided earlier [see (9)], will be helpful in making informed
guesses about its magnitude (or even, after all, estimate it using some observable
data).
6 Possible Extensions
In this concluding section we will briefly discuss some possible extensions and
variations of our model.
Evidence production vs. information gathering. In our model we have as-
sumed that the insiders know from the outset whether the eﬃciencies are high
or low but must invest resources in order to be able to communicate this in-
formation. An alternative assumption would be to say that the insiders at the
outset have just as little information about the eﬃciencies as society, but that
they can invest resources in order to find such (hard) information. Hence, the
insiders’ investment decision would then not be contingent on the true state.
We were using this model specification in an earlier version of the paper, and it
yields very similar results. In fact, most of the analysis is identical to the one
here–the only diﬀerence is the comparison between HE and LF (in particular,
the cut-oﬀ value bk is slightly diﬀerently defined), and even for that comparison
the qualitative results remain the same.
A consumer standard instead of a welfare standard. Throughout we have
assumed that society maximizes total surplus (including any costs of evidence
production). How would the analysis change if we instead assumed a consumer
standard? To see this, first notice that if only consumer welfare counts, the
costs of evidence production will not enter the social welfare function. Moreover,
Figure 1 tells us what the benefits for the consumers of permitting a merger (i.e.,
∆CS in the figure) are. We see that as long as there are negative externalities,
society will always want to block the merger (thus making SR optimal). If there
are positive externalities, then the incentive structure will be similar to what
we have under our welfare standard. Since evidence production is “for free,” it
is fairly easy to see that here SR is always inferior to HE. Moreover, a “mixed”
z-institution will never be optimal. The optimal institution is thus either HE
24
or LF. One can show that there is a cut-oﬀ value of p such that below this HE
is optimal and above it LF is optimal.31
Other parties’ trying to influence the merger control procedure. We have
assumed that only the insiders can provide society with information and thereby
try to influence the decision whether to permit the merger. We think of this as
the most natural case, since the insiders should have better access to information
about any eﬃciencies than, for example, the other firms in the market (i.e.,
the outsiders). Still, one may wonder how the results would be aﬀected if
also the outsiders or the consumers could produce evidence. Again, Figure 1
helps us understand the incentives of these other groups. First suppose we
have positive externalities (we assume again, as in our main model, a welfare
standard). Then we see from the figure that the outsiders’ interests are always
opposed to society’s; hence, the outsiders would not be able to credibly transmit
any information. We also see that the consumers’ and society’s interests are
identical; thus, any information that the consumers had access to would also be
available to society, which would at least mitigate the informational asymmetries
between society and the insiders.
Second, suppose we have negative externalities. Then Figure 1 tells us that
the outsiders and the insiders have identical interests. This means that society
can receive information from two parties instead of only one, which could make
it less attractive to encourage maximal evidence production through HE. On
the other hand, there should also be a free-riding problem, and the convex cost
functions may make evidence production more worthwhile when it is spread out
on two parties. It is thus not clear whether this alternative model would make
31We can write ECSSR = CSN , ECSLF = pCSH + (1− p)CSL, and ECSHE =
pτHEH ∆CSH+CSN (where the notation is self-explanatory). As in the total-welfare-standard
model, we can without excluding any optimal institution presume that zL ≤ zN ≤ zH . Hence,
analogously to (5), we can write
ECS = pτ∗H (zH − zN )∆CSH + (1− zN )ECSSR + zNECSLF .
An institution where (zH − zN ) ∈ (0, 1) cannot be optimal. To see this, suppose that we do
have (zH − zN ) ∈ (0, 1) in an optimal institution. Then we can write
ECS < pτHEH (1− zN )∆CSH+(1− zN )ECSSR+zNECSLF = (1− zN )ECSHE+zNECSLF ,
which contradicts the assumption that the institution is optimal. Hence, either HE or LF
is optimal (notice that this result holds without any particular assumptions about the cost
elasticity). Straightforward algebra shows that the cut-oﬀ value of p above which LF is best
is given by
p = −∆CSL?
1− τHEH
?
∆CSH −∆CSL
.
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an eﬃciency defense more or less desirable and whether, as before, the answer
would depend only on the magnitude of the cost elasticities.32 Finally, with
negative externalities the consumers will always be against the merger. Also
here is it rather diﬃcult to know how the results would change: there should
be diﬀerent eﬀects working in opposite directions. We leave this and the other
open questions to future research.
The insiders’ being able to fabricate evidence. We have assumed that the
insiders can, at a cost, obtain hard evidence that confirms their true type.
Consider the following alternative assumption: the low-eﬃciency insiders can in
addition obtain (false) evidence showing that the eﬃciencies are large.33 Doing
this is costly, and it is modeled in the same way as in our original model. To see
how will this change the analysis and the results, first note that the antitrust
authority very well understands that the evidence may be false and takes this
into account when choosing the optimal institution. Moreover, any evidence
production costs incurred by the low-eﬃciency insiders will always be wasted
from society’s point of view: the costs enter society’s objective function and (as
long as zH > zN ) the false evidence leads to a bad merger being allowed. This
social cost, which comes on top of any social costs in the original model, can
be avoided only by choosing an institution that does not allow for an eﬃciency
defense (i.e., by setting zH = zN ).
In the Appendix we show that, under the assumption that the cost elas-
ticities are constant and identical across types, the optimal institution in this
extension of our model is (again) either SR, LF, or HE. Moreover, the compar-
ison between SR and LF is (trivially) unaﬀected by the extension. What can
and will change, however, are the comparisons between SR and HE and between
LF and HE. In both cases, the conditions for HE to be the best institution are
more stringent relative to those in the original model, because of the additional
social cost associated with any institution that involves an eﬃciency defense. If,
however, HE is strictly optimal in our original model, it remains optimal if the
(marginal) cost of fabricating evidence is suﬃcently large. Furthermore, even
32Such a model would also make the z-institutions more complex, since the decision whether
to permit a merger could be made contingent on, for example, whether only one of the inter-
ested parties have submitted a particular report or whether both have done this.
33This extension has also been studied by Medvedev (2004) in a related model that builds
on a discussion paper version of our paper.
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if one adopts the extreme view that it is as costly to produce (real) evidence
as it is to fabricate evidence, HE (and thus an eﬃciency defense) can neverthe-
less be desirable. The reason is that even if the cost functions for producing
and fabricating evidence are identical, insiders that anticipate high eﬃciency
gains have a stronger incentive to obtain evidence in favor of their case (recall
that ∆πH > ∆πL). Thus, even if the evidence technology is completely inef-
fective in distinguishing between high- and low-eﬃciency firms, in equilibrium,
the evidence presented can be helpful in reaching a desirable decision.
The verification of reports being costly for the antitrust authority. We have
assumed that the antitrust authority can verify the truthfulness of any claim
made by the insiders at no cost. In practice, it may be that the antitrust
authority must devote a considerable amount of resources–related to lawyers,
economists and other support staﬀ, as well as hiring of external experts–to
assess the truthfulness of such claims. If we incorporated such costly verification
into our model, how would this aﬀect our results? The answer is likely to depend
on exactly how one chose to model the costly verification. Under quite broad
circumstances, however, the same basic tradeoﬀ as in our present model should
matter also in such an extension. In particular, in an environment where the
antitrust authority is forced to (or has an ex post incentive to) incur verification
costs each time the insiders make claims about high eﬃciencies, this will add
to the social cost of an eﬃciency defense. Moreover, since the insiders would
not internalize these costs when making their evidence-production decision, we
should expect the costs of having an eﬃciency defense to be larger in such an
environment than in our original model. To what extent other insights from
our analysis would be altered is more diﬃcult to tell (without a more detailed
investigation), and we leave this question to future work.
Appendix
In this appendix we provide calculations that verify the claims made in connec-
tion to the penultimate extension discussed in Section 6.
Assume that the insiders, also when knowing that e = eL, can produce (fab-
ricate) “evidence” that the eﬃciency gains are large. This evidence production
is modeled just as in our original model. The cost function for fabricating evi-
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dence is denotedK (τF ), where the argument τF is the fabricating low-eﬃciency
insiders’ investment level, and the corresponding cost elasticity of evidence fab-
rication is denoted ηF (τF ).
When having soft information that e = eL, the insiders face the following
problem:
max
τF∈[0,1]
[τF zH + (1− τF ) zN ]πL+[τF (1− zH) + (1− τF ) (1− zN )]πN−K (τF )
(they also choose τL, but this will in equilibrium equal zero, so we can safely
ignore that choice). The solution to this problem, τ∗F , equals zero if zH ≤ zN
and is implicitly defined by
∆πL (zH − zN ) = K
0
(τ∗F ) (10)
otherwise.
The expression for expected welfare at stage (i) under our alternative as-
sumption can be written as [cf. (5)]
EW = p [τ∗HzH + (1− τ∗H) zN ]WH + (1− p) [τ∗F zH + (1− τ∗F ) zN ]WL
+p [τ∗H (1− zH) + (1− τ∗H) (1− zN )]WN
+(1− p) [τ∗F (1− zH) + (1− τ∗F ) (1− zN )]WN
−pC (τ∗H)− (1− p)K (τ∗F )
= pτ∗H (zH − zN )∆WH + (1− p) τ∗F (zH − zN )∆WL
+(1− zN )EWSR + zNEWLF − pC (τ∗H)− (1− p)K (τ∗F ) . (11)
Note that this expression is larger for τ∗F = 0 than it is for any τ∗F > 0: fabri-
cation is always bad for welfare.
Restricting attention to the relevant case in which zH ≥ zN , we rewrote the
first-order condition that defines τ∗H in Section 3, obtaining (6). Similarly, for
τ∗F we have
τ∗F (zH − zN ) =
ηF (τ∗F )
∆πL
K (τ∗F ) . (12)
Substituting (6) and (12) in (11) and re-arranging, one has
EW = pC (τ∗H)
∆WH
∆πH
·
η (τ∗H)−
∆πH
∆WH
¸
+ (1− zN )EWSR + zNEWLF
+(1− p)K (τ∗F )
∆WL
∆πL
·
ηF (τ∗F )−
∆πL
∆WL
¸
. (13)
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The last term is negative for any τ∗F > 0 (recall that ∆WL < 0 and ∆πL > 0).
The first term is non-positive if η (τ∗H) ≤ ∆πH∆WH . If the sum of the first and the
last term is negative, then society is strictly better oﬀ by choosing either LF or
SR rather than an institution that induces investment in evidence production.
Let us now prove a result that corresponds to Lemma 1. From now on, we
assume that the cost functions have constant and identical elasticities, denoted
by η. The first line of the proof of Lemma 1 here becomes
EW = (zH − zN )
½
pτ∗H∆WH
η
·
η − ∆πH
∆WH
¸
+
(1− p) τ∗F∆WL
η
·
η − ∆πL
∆WL
¸¾
+(1− zN )EWSR + zNEWLF . (14)
We can write the expression on the first line as (zH − zN )H (zH), where
H (zH) ≡ Aτ∗H +Bτ∗F ,
A ≡ p∆WHη
·
η − ∆πH
∆WH
¸
,
and
B ≡ (1− p)∆WLη
·
η − ∆πL
∆WL
¸
.
In order to get the second line of the lemma, it suﬃces to show that if H (zH) >
0, then (zH − zN )H (zH) is increasing in zH . Diﬀerentiating (zH − zN )H (zH)
with respect to zH and requiring the resulting expression to be greater than
zero yield
Aτ∗H +Bτ∗F + (zH − zN )
·
A∂τ
∗
H
∂zH
+B∂τ
∗
F
∂zH
¸
> 0⇔
Aτ∗H
·
1 + (zH − zN )
∂τ∗H
τ∗H∂zH
¸
+Bτ∗F
·
1 + (zH − zN )
∂τ∗F
τ∗F∂zH
¸
> 0. (15)
Recall the first-order conditions that define τ∗H and τ∗F :
(zH − zN )∆πH = C0 (τ∗H) (16)
and
(zH − zN )∆πL = K0 (τ∗F ) . (17)
Using these, one can easily check that
∂τ∗H
∂zH
=
∆πH
C 00 (τ∗H)
(18)
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and
∂τ∗F
∂zH
=
∆πL
K00 (τ∗F )
. (19)
Using (16)-(19) in (15), we have
Aτ∗H
·
1 +
C0 (τ∗H)
∆πH
∆πH
τ∗HC 00 (τ∗H)
¸
+Bτ∗F
·
1 +
K0 (τ∗F )
∆πL
∆πL
τ∗FK00 (τ∗F )
¸
> 0.
Under the constant (and identical) elasticity assumption, this simplifies to
Aτ∗H
·
1 +
1
η − 1
¸
+Bτ∗F
·
1 +
1
η − 1
¸
> 0
or equivalently Aτ∗H+Bτ∗F > 0. Hence, under the assumption that H (zH) > 0,
the first line of (14) is increasing in zH . This means that we have
EW < (1− zN )
½
pτHEH ∆WH
η
·
η − ∆πH
∆WH
¸
+
(1− p) τHEF ∆WL
η
·
η − ∆πL
∆WL
¸
+EWSR
¾
+zNEWLF ,
which parallels the second line of the proof of Lemma 1. The remaining steps
are completely analogous to the ones in the proof of Lemma 1 and therefore
omitted.
Thus, allowing for the fabrication of evidence as modeled above, we obtain
the following variant of Proposition 1:
Proposition A1. No institution yields a higher expected welfare than the
best one of SR, LF, and HE. Moreover, an institution where zL > zN
is never optimal, and an institution where (zH − zN ) ∈ (0, 1) is never
optimal except possibly in a knife-edge case.
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0Figure 1: Gains and losses for different parties due to the merger.
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Figure 2: Panel A. Welfare comparison of institutions for Regime I.
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Figure 2: Panel B. Welfare comparison of institutions for Regime II.
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